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1. Introduction 
In spite of all the discussion on economic convergence, cross-country analyses of long-
run economic growth reveal a divergent pattern. According to Madisson´s (1994) analysis 
over a sample of 21 countries, the ratio of the highest GDP per capita to the lowest increased 
from 3 to 17 between 1820 and 1989. And Pritchett (1997) estimates that from 1870 to 1990 
the ratio of per capita income between the richest and the poorest countries increased by a 
factor of five. 
This divergent pattern is also observed for more recent periods. Hall and Jones (1997) 
found that the ratio of GDP per worker of the fifth-richest countries to that of the fifth-poorest 
countries increased from 26 to 29 between 1960 and 1988. Easterly and Levine (2001) 
reported that divergence of per capita income has increased from 1960 to 1992. Their 
estimations in Table 1 show that the two higher fifths of countries grew faster than middle 
income countries, and these in turn grew faster than the two lower fifths. 
 
Table 1 
Rich Countries Grow Faster 
Countries classified by income 
per person in 1960 
Average growth of income 
per person 1960 -1992 
Richest fifth 2.2% 
Second richest fifth 2.6% 
Middle fifth 1,8% 
Second poorest fifth 1.2% 
Poorest fifth 1.4% 
        Source: Easterly and Levine (2001). 
Hence, the world division among these three “clubs” –rich countries, middle income countries 
and poor countries– is deepening. A recent World Bank research has confirmed this feature. 
Perry et al (2006) showed that the unimodal distribution of per capita real income across 
countries in 1960 has become a trimodal distribution in 1999. They showed as well that since 
1960 there has been convergence within these “clubs” but divergence amongst them. It is thus 
unavoidable to conclude that the income gap between rich countries and the remainder has 
been widening over a long period. 
 The existence of persisting growth gaps across countries was discovered by Kaldor. In 
his classical paper on the patterns of development he wrote: “there are appreciable differences 
in the rate of growth of labour productivity and of total output in different societies” (Kaldor, 
1961, p. 179). This was the sixth pattern; the first five were as follows: 1) output per worker 
shows continuing growth, with “no recorded tendency for a falling rate of growth of 
productivity”, 2) capital per worker shows continuing growth, 3) the rate of return on 
capital is steady, 4) the capital-output ratio is steady over long periods, and 5) labour and 
capital receive constant shares of total income. 
 Kaldor´s patterns of development imply a world economic structure where 
convergence is not guaranteed. Historical experience of economic development supports this 
vision; even though a few previously underdeveloped economies have been able to take off, 
most underdeveloped economies have been unable to follow suit. Given this scenario, gaining 
an understanding of the underlying mechanisms of economic divergence is one of the most 
challenging tasks facing development analysts. 
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2. Industrialization and Economic Growth 
 It was also Kaldor who put forward the thesis that cross-country variations of 
economic performance were related to industrialization: 
 
“Fast rates of growth are almost invariably associated with the fast rate of growth of 
the secondary sector, mainly manufacturing, and… this is an attribute of an 
intermediate stage of development” (Kaldor, 1966, p. 7). 
 
Following this line of research, Chenery, Robinson and Syrquin (1986) analyzed the 
relationship between industrialization and economic growth. Using data from a selected group 
of industrial and semi-industrial countries, and after identifying some unlikely exceptions –
poverty traps, persistence of the Dutch disease phenomenon in the primary sector, and early 
development on export services, Chenery et al (1986) claimed to have found enough evidence 
to support Kaldor´s hypothesis: 
 
“Is industrialization necessary to continued growth? Our models of the 
transformation suggest that the answer is generally yes” (p. 350). “(…) We conclude 
that –on both empirical and theoretical grounds– a period in which the share of 
manufacturing rises substantially is a virtually universal feature of the structural 
transformation” (p. 350). 
 
Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny (1989) also concurred to this viewpoint: 
 
“Virtually every country that experienced rapid growth of productivity and living 
standards over the last 200 years has done so by industrializing. Countries that have 
successfully industrialized –turned to production of manufactures taking advantage of 
scale economies– are the ones that grew rich, be they 18th-century Britain or 20th-
century Korea and Japan” (p. 1003). 
 
Some twentieth-century experiences of economic development are consistent with this pattern. 
Newly industrialized countries are among the highest growing economies over the period 
1965-1990; they are, in order of performance, Singapore (1), Korea (2), Taiwan (5), Hong-
Kong (6), China (7), Indonesia (8), Japan (10), Malaysia (11), Thailand (18), Brazil (19) and 
Yugoslavia (20). On the other hand, all the lowest growing economies in the same period are 
non-industrialized countries (see Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1995, Tables 12.1 and 12.2). 
Besides, the most recent successful experiences of economic take offs, China and India, are 
also related to industrialization and economic diversification. 
 Thus, industrialization matters. That is why the advice of Leontief (1963) for 
developing countries was the following: 
 
“Given the country mix of resources and the available technologies, the essence of the 
process of development [is] to create an economic system as similar as possible to the 
system of the most developed economies” (p. 164). 
 
Hence, if industrialization is the key to economic development, why do we observe so very 
few cases of successful economic take offs? Why cannot we the underdeveloped countries 
catch the train of progress? This paper attempts to provide an answer. According to a certain 
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vision of economic development, a period of structural transformation is previously required 
in order to take advantage of the external effects of industrialization on productivity, 
competitiveness and economic growth. During that period, national institutions and economic 
agents have to commit themselves to industrialize (Hirschman, 1958; Amsden, 1989; Landes, 
1998). Coordination problems related to this commitment are perhaps what make it so difficult 
to gain access to the exclusive “club” of developed economies (Hirschman, 1958; Murphy, 
Shleifer and Vishny, 1989). In summary, our main hypothesis is that the causal relationship 
from industrialization to economic growth is non-linear: each society should endeavour to 
achieve some minimum level of manufacturing technological integration before it can reap the 
benefits of industrialization in economic growth. 
In this structuralist vision, each country is considered as some kind of living being that 
ought to transform itself into an adult before being able to survive and compete successfully in 
the world markets. The latter analogy is based on empirical analyses of economic 
development. Chenery, Robinson and Syrquin (1986) identified that along the process of 
industrialization some structural changes take place –economies grow up. The main features 
of this structural transformation are, according to these authors, the following: changes in final 
demands, changes in intermediate demands and changes in international trade. The first 
structural change is the well-known Engel´s law: income elasticity of food demand is lower 
than 1; thus, the agricultural sector expands slower than the economy as a whole. The second 
structural change is what these authors refer to as input-output deepening: 
 
“As countries industrialize, their productive structures become more “roundabout” in 
the sense that a higher proportion of output is sold to other producers rather than to 
final users. (…), this phenomenon can be broke down into two parts: first, a shift in 
output mix toward manufacturing and other sectors that use more intermediate inputs; 
and second, technological changes within a sector that lead to a greater use of 
intermediate inputs” (Chenery, Robinson and Syrquin, 1986, p. 57). 
 
The third structural change is related to the evolution of international trade: comparative 
advantages change from the primary sector to the manufacturing sector. The following 
quotation is illustrative: 
 
“Through import substitution and the expansion of manufactured exports, developing 
countries shift away from the specialization in primary products that is characteristic of 
early stages of development. Underlying this shift are changes in supply conditions –
accumulation of skills and physical capital plus the greater availability of intermediate 
inputs– as well as economies of scale based on a growing domestic market for 
manufactured goods” (Chenery, Robinson and Syrquin, p. 63). 
 
Hence, according to the structuralist vision of economic development, it might be true that 
only when a country´s structural transformation is sufficiently advanced that it might open 
itself to world markets, become an exporter of manufactured goods and enjoy the benefits of 
industrialization –including higher growth rates. 
Theoretical analyses that are consistent with this vision include growth and 
international trade models such as those of Lucas (1988), Young (1991), Matsuyama (1992) 
and Ortiz (2004, 2008). In these models, learning-by-doing is the engine of growth. Under an 
open economy regime, a country´s pattern of specialization is determined by its inherited 
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advantages. Thus, advantages in high-learning economic activities, typically manufacturing, 
drive the economy along a superior path of economic development; whilst advantages in low-
learning technological activities might lock the economy up in those activities and lead to 
sluggish economic growth. 
Several reasons can be put forward in order to explain the strong economic 
externalities from the manufacturing sector. First, product diversification, and its important 
effects on productivity (Romer 1987, 1990), takes place typically in the manufacturing 
sector. Second, the continuous displacement of the technological frontier in the 
manufacturing sector allows the sector´s learning potential to remain high (Lucas, 1988; 
Young, 1993). Third, the manufacturing sector is characterized by intensive application of 
science and technology to transform intermediate goods and raw materials; moreover, the 
sector´s generation of new goods and new technologies induces the appropriation and 
diffusion of humanity's more important productive force: scientific knowledge (Romer, 
1986). Fourth, the productivity of the manufacturing sector, as producer of intermediate and 
capital goods, impinges directly on the system profitability (Sraffa, 1960) and the rate of 
economic growth (Rebelo, 1991). Fifth, the manufacturing sector typically enjoys internal 
and external economies that enhance aggregate productivity (Caballero and Lyons, 1990). 
Some words of caution are required at this point. It is convenient to emphasize that 
there is nothing magical about manufacturing; other economic activities requiring an 
intensive use of intelligence and technology –informatics, communications, biotechnology, 
scientific research, etc.– may also become leaders of economic growth (Landes, 1998, ch. 
15; Rodrik, 2006). 
 
3. Some Empirical Support 
 
3.1. A Small Panel Data 
 According to the analysis of structural transformation (Chenery et al, 1986), economic 
diversification is directly related to production “roundaboutness”. It is thus convenient to test 
the diversification effects on economic growth by using a measure of interindustrial 
dependence as a proxy. In order to do that, a small panel data set containing such a measure is 
used in this analysis. 
Based on Kubo's work on cross-country comparisons of interindustrial linkages (Kubo, 
1985), Kubo, de Melo, Robinson and Syrquin (1986) calculated comparable indices of 
aggregate interindustrial linkages using information from 30 input-output matrices of nine 
industrialized or semi-industrialized countries: Colombia, Mexico, Turkey, Yugoslavia, Japan, 
South Korea, Taiwan, Israel and Norway. Observations were taken for some years between 
1950 and 1975. According to the authors, each country represented a different stage of 
structural change. To that extent, the sample may be thought of as being representative of the 
experience of economic development. 
The procedure to calculate the mentioned indices was the following. First, the authors 
rearranged each matrix into 14 comparable economic sectors and calculated the matrix of 
technical coefficients A = [aij], where aij is the technical coefficient measuring the amount (in 
value terms) of input i which is consumed in the production process of one unit of good j. 
Subsequently, they calculated the Leontief matrix, L = I-A, where I denotes the identity 
matrix of the same order as matrix A. Finally they obtained an index of overall linkages as 
follows: (OL) = f'(L')-1i, where OL is a scalar, f is a 14x1 weight vector whose elements add 
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up to 1, i is a 14x1 unit vector, the apostrophe (') denotes matrix transposition, and the power -
1 denotes matrix inversion. Let us decompose this expression: (L')-1i is a 14x1 vector whose 
elements measure the degree of backward technological integration of the corresponding 
sectors, i.e. each element measures the proportion of gross output which is produced in the 
economy per unit value of final demand in the corresponding sector. The final expression 
(OL) is then a weighted average of these measures, where the weights are taken from the 
representative structure of the final demand vector for a semi-industrial country (see Chenery, 
Robinson and Syrquin, Chapter 4, 1986). These authors also obtain an index of domestic 
linkages (DL) by excluding imported intermediate inputs from the input-output matrix; the 
calculation is completely analogous to the previous one. 
Appendix 1 exhibits the data on measures of interindustrial linkages, overall linkages 
(OL) and domestic linkages (DL), for the above panel of countries. It also includes the 
equivalent annual growth rates of per capita GDP during 10 years (G10), the real per capita 
GDP (RGDP), the average schooling years in the total population over age 25 (EDU), the 
average investment ratio in the next decade (I10), and the equivalent annual growth rate of 
population in the next decade (GN10). 
 
3.2. Growth Regressions from the Panel Data 
Appendix 1 is a small unbalanced panel. Using this information the growth regressions 
shown in Table 2 were run. Since cross-country regressions are usually subject to 
heteroscedasticity –this hypothesis cannot be rejected at the 1 percent level, OLS estimates are 
corrected using White´s consistent covariance matrix. The dependent variable is the average 
annual growth rate of GDP for the next 10 years (G10).  
The first set of included independent variables (the basic set from now on), are the real 
per capita GDP (RGDP), the average annual growth rate of population in the following decade 
(GN10), the average investment ratio in the next decade (I10), and the initial level of 
educational attainment (EDU). These variables are thought to be robustly correlated with 
economic growth (Levine and Renelt, 1992). The RGDP coefficient is expected to be negative 
because of convergence effects; the EDU coefficient is expected to be positive because of 
human capital accumulation; the I10 coefficient is expected to be positive because of capital 
accumulation; and the GN10 coefficient is expected to be negative because population growth 
diminishes directly output per capita. The second set of independent variables contains the 
measures of interindustrial linkages (OL and DL), the dummy variable for the 70´s (D70), and 
the interactive dummies (OL*D70 and DL*D70). Because of the oil shocks of the 70´s, these 
interactive dummies are added in order to account for the downward jump of growth rates 
during this period; it is likely that the 70´s oil shocks diminished the positive externalities from 
interindustrial linkages because oil is the most important intermediate input for the current 
technology. The third set of independent variables contains the country dummies; notice that 
Colombia is taken as the reference country. 
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Table 2 
Growth Regressions from Panel Data 
(Sample = 30, t-statistics in parentheses) 
Variable\Regression (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
CONSTANT -0.14380 (-0.02512) 
0.44619 
(0.21906) 
-4.50778 
(-1.45470) 
-4.88106 
(-0.78800) 
0.26691 
(0.09231) 
4.51025 
(1.95658) 
RGDP -0.00102** (-2.87267) 
-0.00056***
(-3.17038) 
-0.00054***
(-2.94060) 
-0.00059***
(-3.24556) 
-0.00057** 
(-2.81040) 
-0.00077***
(-4.09695) 
GN10 -0.98734 (-0.91080) 
-0.56345 
(-1.64022) 
-0.65040* 
(-1.98943) 
-0.57784 
(-1.65080) 
-0.45755 
(-1.12595) 
-0.60034 
(-1.48737) 
I10 0.05116 (0.55827) 
-0.04882 
(-0.79414) 
0.37445* 
(1.89191) 
-0.06080 
(-0.93833) 
-0.04883 
(-0.78782) 
-0.09559 
(-1.54282) 
I10-SQ   -0.00797** (-2.29897)    
EDU -0.10841 (-0.15431) 
0.12286 
(0.41848) 
0.01416 
(0.05004) 
0.17634 
(0.58099) 
0.14251 
(0.43950) 
0.782443***
(3.24285) 
OL 0.11350* (1.91701) 
0.10519***
(5.44688) 
0.10917***
(5.15731) 
0.26410* 
(1.77816) 
0.08314*** 
(3.43699)  
OL*D70 -0.01232 (-1.59489) 
-0.01821***
(-4.25776) 
-0.01976***
(-4.63016)    
D70    -1.22414***(-3.15716) 
-1.23085*** 
(-3.44334)  
OL-SQ    -0.00111 (-1.20040)   
DL     0.02734 (0.91989) 
0.05205** 
(2.20207) 
DL*D70      -0.01201 (-1.43523) 
MEXICO 1.80144* (1.90385)      
TURKEY 0.66749 (0.55614)      
YUGOSLAVIA -2.00966 (-1.56229)      
JAPAN 0.759815 (0.33805)      
SOUTH KOREA -0.67507 (-0.41788)      
TAIWAN 0.20117 (0.12088)      
ISRAEL 2.05202 (0.59033)      
NORWAY 1.00252 (0.43667)      
R2 adj. 0.72859 0.74007 0.75375 0.72004 0.72010 0.64091 
S.E. 1.13750 1.11320 1.08349 1.15529 1.15516 1.30841 
         Significance level: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%. 
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The first regression uses as independent variables the basic set, the overall linkages 
measure (OL), the related interactive dummy (OL*D70), and the country dummies. These last 
set of variables is added in order to capture possible fixed-country effects. However, none of 
the country dummies is significant, and neither are they significant as a whole. Because the 
degrees of freedom are significantly reduced, this regression does not yield significant 
coefficients. Thus, the country dummies were dropped in order to run the second regression. 
In this second regression, the initial level of per capita GDP (RGDP), the overall 
linkages measure (OL), and the corresponding interactive dummy (OL*D70) are significant at 
the 1% level and their respective coefficients exhibit the expected signs: negative for RGDP 
and OL*D70, and positive for OL. The basic regressors different to RGDP –GN10, I10 and 
EDU– are not significant. Moreover, the coefficient associated with the average investment 
rate (I10) is estimated as being negative. 
Because of this odd feature, the third regression is run including as regressor the square 
of the average investment rate (I10-SQ). In this regression, estimated coefficients of all the 
basic independent variables obtain the expected signs: RGDP (-), GN10 (-), I10 (+) and EDU 
(+). Moreover, the RGDP coefficient is significant at the 1% level, the GN10 coefficient is 
significant at the 10% level, and the I10 coefficient is significant at the 10% level. The 
coefficient associated with the squared average investment rate (I10-SQ) is negative and 
significant at the 5% level; there is no easy explanation for this result, but it is clearly deduced 
that there are not accelerating effects on economic activity derived from investment. The 
coefficients associated with the overall linkages measure (OL) and the corresponding 
interactive dummy variable (OL*D70) preserve their signs and levels of statistical 
significance. This third regression is our preferred; it yields the regression with the highest 
adjusted R2, 75.4%, and the coefficients of all standard variables get the expected signs. 
Therefore, according to the second and third regressions, data are not contrary to the 
hypothesis that technological integration impinges positively on economic growth in semi-
industrial and industrialized economies. 
The fourth regression was run in order to verify the possible existence of non linear 
effects from overall linkages; that is why the regression includes the square of the measure of 
overall linkages (OL-SQ). However, the associated coefficient is not statistically significant 
for this sample of countries. 
The fifth regression was run in order to check which measure of interindustrial 
linkages was best related with economic growth. This exercise yields that when both measures 
are included, the overall linkages measure (OL) is significant whilst the domestic linkages 
measure (DL) is not. Since the difference between the measures of overall linkages and 
domestic linkages is accounted for imported intermediate inputs, the previous result suggests 
that commercial openness might favour economic growth if it leads to a greater economic 
diversification (Ortiz, 1994). 
Although aggregate interindustrial linkages are better predictors of growth than 
domestic linkages, the sixth regression replaces the measure of overall linkages (OL) and the 
corresponding 70´s interactive dummy variable (OL*D70), both of them included in the 
second regression, by the measure of domestic linkages (DL) and the corresponding 
interactive variable (DL*D70). This regression yields that the measure of domestic linkages 
has a positive effect on growth, but it is only significant at the 5% level. Besides, the 
corresponding interactive dummy variable (DL*D70) is not significant. In this case, however, 
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the measure of educational attainment (EDU) is significant at the 1% level. This last result is 
probably due to the high correlation of education (EDU) with the overall linkages measure 
(OL): the correlation coefficient between these two variables is 78%. Thus, it seems that EDU 
behaves in the sixth regression as a proxy for OL. 
Why is education not significant in these regressions? A first explanation may be that 
this variable suffers from measurement problems; after all, educational attainment (EDU) is a 
quantitative index of years of education and, thus, it does not capture cross-country differences 
in education quality. A second possibility is that educational attainment is itself an endogenous 
variable: it may be determined by the maturity of the whole economic structure. 
This second possibility would imply that structural transformation imposes some 
education requirements (Klees, 1989; Levin and Kelley, 1994; Bils and Klenow, 2000; 
Easterly, 2001, ch. 4). Data are not inconsistent with this hypothesis. In Appendix 2A, a 
regression was run for educational attainment (EDU) against the index of overall linkages 
(OL) and the set of country dummies (Colombia is the reference country). The coefficient 
associated with overall linkages is estimated positive and statistically significant at all levels; 
the coefficients associated with some industrialized country dummies –Yugoslavia, Japan, 
Israel and Norway– are estimated positive and significant. If educational attainment is run 
against the basic set of regressors and the overall linkages measure (Appendix 2B), the 
measure of overall linkages (OL) and the initial income level per capita (RGDP) exhibit the 
highest statistical significance level, in that order. Hence, education and economic growth 
might depend jointly on the measure of overall linkages. 
 
3.3. A Cross-Country Data Set 
The above considerations and estimations are based on a small but representative 
sample of nine semi-industrial and industrial countries. Since the data set is a non-balanced 
panel, the results might be subject to all sorts of potential problems of endogeneity. Instead of 
attempting to solve them, this research project focused on the analysis of a larger cross-
country data set of fifty two (52) countries (Appendix 3). Since the project aims at estimating 
the impact of industrialization on economic growth, three industrialization indices were built: 
the 1980 share of the manufacturing sector in GDP (IND), the 1980 input-output coefficient 
for the whole economy (IO), and the input-output coefficient for the manufacturing sector 
(IOMAN). The data for these indices were collected from the United Nations´ National 
Accounts Statistics. The year 1980 was chosen mainly because information for many less 
developed countries and even for developed countries is not available for previous years; 
thus, a previous year analysis would reduce both the sample size and the representativeness 
of less developed economies. 
It would have been useful to count with a direct measure of interindustrial linkages 
as in the panel data set. Since this information is not available, the project took advantage 
of the patterns of structural transformation that were examined before to postulate that the 
tightness of interindustrial linkages (and the degree of economic diversification) must be 
correlated with the manufacturing GDP share and the input-output coefficients for the 
whole economy and the manufacturing sector (IND, IO and IOMAN). Even though cross-
country differences of product composition and relative prices may affect these coefficients 
(As Table 3 shows, some of these coefficients are too high for the corresponding level of 
development), the research project used them because there was no alternative. On the 
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other hand, an ordering of these coefficients shows that in general highly developed 
economies tend to exhibit higher industrialization indices. 
Taking into account the shift from panel data to cross-country analysis, the 
methodological approach is quite similar. The dependent variable is the average growth rate 
of per capita GDP between 1980 and 2000; in order to estimate this variable a semi-
logarithmic regression of per capita GDP against time is run for each country over the 
period 1980-2000. The source of GDP data is the Penn–World Table (Heston, Summers 
and Aten, 2006). A basic set of independent variables is defined: the per capita real gross 
domestic product in 1980 (RGDP), the average rate of population over the period (GPOP), 
the average investment rate over the period (I), and the initial educational attainment 
(EDU). A second set of variables include the three industrialization measures and the 
dummy variable for oil exporting countries. 
The educational attainment variable was taken from Barro and Lee (1993) statistical 
data base. As education data for Burkina Fasso, Cape Verde, Nigeria and Oman are not 
available for 1980, they were estimated taking advantage of the high correlation coefficient 
across countries between the log of education attainment and life expectancy at birth, 89%. 
 
3.4 Cross-Country Growth Regressions 
 Appendix 3 is a cross-country data base. It contains information for 52 countries of 
different levels of development. Using this information the growth regressions shown in Table 
3 were run. As in the panel data exercises, the hypothesis of heteroscedasticity cannot be 
rejected at the 1 percent level. Hence, OLS estimates are corrected using White´s consistent 
covariance matrix. 
 The first regresssion includes as independent variables the basic set. All the estimated 
coefficients yield the expected signs, and all of them, with the exception of the log of 
education, are significant at the 5% level. The second and third regressions add the 
manufacturing share (IND) as independent variable in a linear and a quadratic way, 
respectively; however, the associated coefficients are not significant. The fourth and fifth 
regressions use instead the aggregate input-output coefficient (IO) as independent variable; but 
the associated coefficients in these regressions are not significant either. The sixth and seventh 
regressions use the manufacturing input-output coefficient (IOMAN) as independent variable; 
in this case, the quadratic expression in IOMAN –seventh regression– does yield estimated 
coefficients which are significant at the 1% level.  
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Cross-Country Growth Regressions  
(t-statistics in parentheses) 
   Regression (1)          (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13)
Constant 0.05674 (0.16038) 
0.16875 
(0.50797) 
0.26431 
(0.6626) 
0.40812 
(0.83261) 
2.21629 
(1.43522) 
0.33856 
(0.37354) 
10.00887***
(3.34553) 
9.84068*** 
(3.10788) 
10.63516***
(3.24424) 
10.2381*** 
(3.86846) 
10.0529*** 
(3.68844) 
-2.15333 
(-1.64705) 
-9.70280 
(-0.79557) 
RDGP -3.16E-5** (-2.34797) 
-3.56E-5** 
(-2.53900) 
-3.60E-5**
(-2.56567) 
-3.65E-5**
(-2.55349) 
-4.32E-5***
(-2.14349) 
-3.23E-5**
(-2.29009) 
-3.45E-5*** 
(-3.12373) 
-3.37E-5*** 
(-2.97735) 
-3.73E-5*** 
(-3.01506) 
-3.14E-5***
(-3.20147) 
-3.35E-5***
(-2.70446) 
-0.00013***
(-3.11367) 
-0.00013***
(-3.04099) 
GPOP -0.20333** (-2.27707) 
-0.21291** 
(-2.39824) 
-0.19966**
(-2.19403) 
-0.20294**
(-2.20626) 
-0.19222** 
(-2.14349) 
-0.20211**
(-2.20878) 
-0.24791*** 
(-2.84357) 
-0.23323* 
(-1.71638) 
-0.26631*** 
(-3.08943) 
-0.27245***
(-3.40144) 
-0.27049***
(-3.26755) 
-0.54487***
(-3.16842) 
-0.51465** 
(-2.72054) 
I 0.057174** (2.44650) 
0.06580** 
(2.47257) 
0.06330** 
(2.45208) 
0.06472** 
(2.33682) 
0.06650** 
(2.53642) 
0.05833** 
(2.39390) 
0.05742** 
(2.63578) 
0.05834** 
(2.60649) 
0.12315* 
(1.80317) 
0.06623*** 
(3.22634) 
0.06817*** 
(2.92324) 
-0.00161 
(-0.06640) 
4.47e-5 
(0.00178) 
I-SQ             -0.00180 (-0.96911) 
Log(EDU) 0.16992 (1.13509) 
0.26903* 
(1.68514) 
0.29987** 
(2.10728) 
0.25903 
(1.57295) 
0.32350** 
(2.07390) 
0.17173 
(1.13424) 
0.15780 
(1.02852) 
0.14230 
(0.67342) 
0.09331 
(0.60898)   
0.57148 
(1.42607) 
0.52239 
(1.30726) 
IND 
  
-0.01928 
(-1.23188) 
-0.03848 
(-0.96244) 
 
 
 
         
IND-SQ             0.00060 (0.56153) 
IO            -0.01276 (-0.84042) 
-0.10360 
(-1.39379) 
IO-SQ             0.00104 (1.22581) 
IOMAN      -0.00452 (-0.31030) 
-0.30926*** 
(-3.14848) 
-0.30780*** 
(-3.06736) 
-0.34442*** 
(-3.27587) 
-0.31446***
(-3.56954) 
-0.30965***
(-3.46976) 
0.06450*** 
(3.63052) 
0.29297 
(0.80622) 
IOMAN-SQ       0.00240*** (2.89407) 
0.00241*** 
(2.84086) 
0.00271*** 
(3.09417) 
0.00245*** 
(3.26143) 
0.00241*** 
(3.17732)  
-0.00173 
(-0.63057) 
PETROL            0.095153 (0.32082)   
R2 Adj.              0.38592 0.39002 0.37871 0.38266 0.38236 0.373983 0.41163 0.39886 0.41667 0.41394 0.40177 0.50953 0.48258
S.E.              0.66303 0.66081 0.66691 0.66479 0.66495 0.66944 0.64900 0.66720 0.64622 0.64772 0.65441 0.35039 0.35989
No. Obs.              52 52 52 52 52 52 52 48 52 52 52 21 21
IOMAN min.              64.4 63.9 63.6 64.2 64.2
         Significance level: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.
 Taking into account that educational attainment is estimated for four countries, they are 
excluded from the sample and the eight regression is run for just 48 observations; this 
regression yields quite similar coefficients to the previous one, and the significance levels are 
practically equal. The ninth regression includes in the set of regressors the square of the 
average investment rate (I-SQ); the estimated coefficient is negative –as in the panel data 
exercises– but it is not significant. All not significant variables were dropped in the tenth 
regression; the result improves greatly: the estimated coefficients exhibit the expected sign: 
RGDP (-), GPOP (-), I (+), IOMAN (-), and IOMAN-SQ (+), and all of them are significant at 
the 1%. The eleventh regression is run in order to test whether the condition of oil exporter has 
some effect on economic growth, but the corresponding estimated coefficient is not 
significant. Our preferred estimation is regression 10, for it exhibits the highest significance 
levels. Regressions 12 and 13 are run for the 21 higher income countries of the sample 
excluding oil exporting countries (Norway, Denmark, Iceland, Canada, Sweden, Netherlands, 
Austria, Germany, France, Finland, Japan, New Zealand, Spain, Argentina, Portugal, 
Uruguay, Cyprus, Mexico, Costa Rica, Chile and Mauritius). The results confirmed that in this 
case the relationship between the manufacturing input-output coefficient and economic growth 
is linear, as in the panel data exercises. 
Since the cross-country regressions 7 to 11 yield that economic growth is a significant 
convex function in the manufacturing input-output coefficient (IOMAN), the minimum 
IOMAN value is estimated as follows: -α/(2β), where α (< 0) is the estimated IOMAN 
coefficient, and β (> 0) is the estimated IOMAN2 coefficient. The IOMAN threshold 
estimations fluctuate slightly around the value 64 (See Table 3). 
Using the coefficients of regression 10, Table 4 shows the estimated effect on the long-
run rate of growth (∆g) from a 1 point increase in the manufacturing input-output coefficient 
(∆IOMAN = 1) according to the inherited level of IOMAN: 
 
Table 4 
Effect of a Point Increase of IOMAN on 
the Long-Run Rate of Economic Growth 
IOMAN 60 64 70 76 
∆g -2.0 -0.1 2,9 5,8 
Source: Own estimations. 
A point increase of the manufacturing input-output coefficient –leaving everything else 
constant– would reduce the long-run rate of growth for a country with a low coefficient 
(IOMAN < 64); a country like Colombia (IOMANCOL = 64.2), whose IOMAN is close to the 
minimum, would not find too much effect on growth; but a country like Japan (IOMANJAP = 
70.4) would increase its long-run growth rate in around 3%; and Korea (IOMANKOR = 76.4) in 
around 6%. This exercise shows, thus, how strong are the accelerating effects of 
manufacturing technological integration after surpassing the threshold of industrialization.1
As in the panel data econometric exercises, the cross-country regressions reveal that 
educational attainment [log(EDU)] does not seem to be a good predictor of economic growth 
once one controls for manufacturing interindustrial linkages (IOMAN). However, as shown by 
                                                 
1 The exercise in Table 4 assumes that changes in IOMAN reflect changes in manufacturing technological 
integration; it would be absurd to claim that higher input-output coefficients due to relaxation of cost minimizing 
behaviour would lead to higher economic growth. 
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the cross-country regression in Appendix 4, education does seem to depend on some structural 
factors, like real GDP (RGDP: positive and significant correlation), population growth 
(GPOP: negative and significant correlation), average investment rate (I: positive and 
marginally significant correlation), and aggregate input-output coefficient (IO: positive and 
highly significant correlation). The exercises revealed that the manufacturing input-output 
coefficient (IOMAN) is not a better predictor of educational attainment than the aggregate 
input-output coefficient (IO). Thus, as in the panel data exercises, aggregate measures of 
industrialization –the measure of overall linkages (OL) in the panel data, and the aggregate 
input-output coefficient (IO) in the cross-country data base– does seem to impinge positively 
on educational attainment levels. 
 
4. Some Concluding Comments 
Regression analyses on a small panel data set and a larger cross-country data set are 
the basis for the following comments: 
1) There exists a nonlinear –quadratic– relationship between industrialization and economic 
growth. This feature is consistent with the hypothesis that countries enjoy the benefits of 
industrialization in economic growth after surpassing some threshold of technological 
integration in the manufacturing sector. 
2) The referred relationship becomes linear only for industrial and semi-industrial countries; in 
this case the econometric exercises capture mainly the dominant positive effect of 
industrialization on growth for sufficiently high indices of technological integration in the 
manufacturing sector. 
3) The cross-country econometric analyses reveal that technological integration in the 
manufacturing sector is highly correlated with economic growth, whilst aggregate 
technological integration is not. This result might imply that the manufacturing sector behaves 
as a leading sector. 
4) The previous features help to explain why rich (industrialized) countries tend to grow faster 
in the long-run than poorer countries. Corollary: the convergent effect related to initial GDP 
per capita is overcome by divergent effects related to investment and industrialization. 
5) Economic growth is not significantly correlated with educational attainment when one 
controls for technological integration in the manufacturing sector. Two likely explanations 
may act together to explain this result: first, measurement error bias due to the exclusion of 
education quality levels (EDU is a quantitative measure of education in years); second, 
educational attainment might not be a determinant of economic growth, instead it might be 
determined by the degree of economic development. 
6) The latter hypothesis is not rejected by the available data sets: this paper finds a strong 
positive correlation between education and the measures of overall linkages (OL in the panel 
data regressions, IO in the cross-country regressions). If this hypothesis is true, education is 
revealed as a necessary but not sufficient condition for economic growth. In whatever 
scenario, education cannot be neglected. It provides many more external benefits than just 
economic growth; for instance, as seen before, education and life expectancy at birth are 
highly correlated. 
Further analyses are required in order to test the hypothesis of an industrialization 
threshold for enhancing long-run economic growth. The complex relationship between 
education and economic growth should also be reviewed. If our hypotheses are confirmed, 
some policy recommendations would be adequate. First, government economic policies aimed 
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at increasing economic growth should enhance the process of economic diversification and 
structural transformation. Second, educational policies should go hand-in-hand with 
industrialization policies so that human capital supply matches human capital demand along 
the path of development. 
 
References 
 
Amsden, Alice. 1989. Asia's Next Giant, Oxford University Press. 
Barro, Robert J. and Jong-Wha Lee. 1993. “International Comparisons of Educational 
Attainment”, Journal of Monetary Economics, Vol. 32, No. 3 (December), pp. 363-394. 
Barro, Robert and Xavier Sala-i-Martin. 1995. Economic Growth, McGraw Hill. 
Bils, Mark and Peter J. Klenow. 2000. “Does Schooling Cause Growth?”, American Economic 
Review, Vol. 90, No. 5, December, pp. 1160-1183. 
Caballero, R.J. and R.K. Lyons. 1990. “Internal Versus External Economies in European 
Industry”, European Economic Review, Vol. 34, pp. 805-830. 
Chenery, H.B.; S. Robinson and M. Syrquin. 1986. Industrialization and Growth: A 
Comparative Study, Washington, published for the World Bank, Oxford University Press. 
Easterly, William. 2001. The Elusive Quest of Growth. Economists’ Adventures and 
Misadventures in the Tropics, Cambridge: MIT Press. 
Easterly, William and Ross Levine. 2001. "It's Not Factor Accumulation: Stylized Facts 
and Growth Models", World Bank Economic Review, Vol. 15, No. 2, pp. 177-220. 
Hall, Robert E. and Charles I. Jones. 1997. “Levels of Economic Activity across Countries”, 
American Economic Review, Vol. 87, No. 2, Papers and Proceedings of the Hundred and 
Fourth Annual Meeting of the American Economic Association, May, pp. 173-177. 
Heston, Alan; Robert Summers and Bettina Aten. 2006. Penn World Table Version 6.2, 
Center for International Comparisons of Production, Income and Prices at the University of 
Pennsylvania. 
Hirschman, Albert O. 1958. The Strategy of Economic Development, Yale University Press, 
Inc., New Haven. 
Kaldor, Nicholas. 1961. "Capital Accumulation and Economic Growth", The Theory of 
Capital, eds. F.A. Lutz and D. Hague, ch. 10, Macmillan, London, pp. 177-222. 
____________. 1966. Causes of the Slow Rate of Economic Growth of the United Kingdom, 
An Inaugural Lecture, p. 7, quoted by Nishimizu and Robinson, Ch. 10, p. 289, in Chenery, 
Robinson and Syrquin (1986). 
Klees, Steven J. 1989. “The Economics of Education: A more that Slightly Jaundiced View of 
Where We are Now”, in Prospects for Educational Planning, Francoise Caillods (ed.), 
UNESCO, IIEP, Paris, pp. 244-291. 
Kubo, Y. 1985. “A Cross-Country Comparison of Interindustrial Linkages and the Role of 
Imported Intermediate Inputs”, World Development, Vol. 13, No. 12, pp. 1287-1298. 
Kubo Y., J. de Melo, S. Robinson, and M. Syrquin. 1986. “Interdependence and Industrial 
Structure” in Chenery, Robinson and Syrquin (1986). 
Landes, David. 1998. The Wealth and Poverty of Nations, W.W. Norton and Company. 
Leontief, Wassily. 1963. "The Structure of Development", Chapter 8 in Leontief, Input-Output 
Economics, Oxford University Press, 1986. 
Levin, Henry M. and Carolyn Kelley. 1994. “Can Education Do It Alone?”, Economics of 
Education Review, Vol. XIII, No. 2 , pp 97-108, Elsevier Science Ltd.  
 14
CIDSE 
Levine, R. and D. Renelt. 1992. “A Sensitivity Analysis of Cross-Country Growth 
Regressions”, American Economic Review, Vol. 82, N. 4, pp. 942-963. 
Lucas, Robert Jr. 1988. “On the Mechanics of Economic Development”, Journal of Monetary 
Economics, Vol. 22, pp. 3-42. 
Madisson, A. 1994. “Explaining the Economic Performance of Nations, 1820-1989”, in W.J.  
Matsuyama, Kiminori. 1992. "Agricultural Productivity, Comparative Advantage and 
Economic Growth", Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 58, pp. 317-334. 
Murphy, Kevin; Andrei Shleifer and Robert Vishny. 1989. “Industrialization and the Big 
Push”, Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 97, No. 5, pp. 1003-1026. 
Perry, G.; O. Arias; W.M. Maloney; J.H. López and L. Servén. 2006. Poverty Reduction and 
Growth: Virtuous and Vicious Circles, World Bank Latin American and Caribbean Studies, 
Washington. 
Ortiz, Carlos H. 1994. “Integración Tecnológica y Crecimiento Económico: Evidencia 
Empírica”, Ensayos sobre Política Económica, No. 25, pp. 73-95, Banco de la República, 
Bogotá, Junio. 
____________. 2004. “Learning-by-Doing and Government Spending in an Economic 
Growth with Special Reference to Colombia”, published as “An Economic Growth Model 
showing Government Spending with Reference to Colombia and Learning-by- Doing”, 
Colombian Economic Journal, Vol. 2, No 1, pp. 156-188. 
____________. 2008.  “Aprendizaje en la Producción de Bienes de Capital, Crecimiento 
Acelerado y Cambio Estructural”, Cuadernos de Economía, Universidad Nacional, Bogotá, 
próxima publicación. 
Pritchett, Lant. 1997. “Divergence, Big Time”, Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 11, 
No. 3. pp. 3-17. 
Rebelo, Sergio. 1991. "Long-Run Policy Analysis and Long-Run Growth", Journal of 
Political Economy, Vol. 99, No. 3, pp. 500-521. 
Rodrik, Dani. 2006. “Industrial Development: Stylized Facts and Policies”, Draft, John F. 
Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University. 
Romer, P. 1986. "Increasing Returns and Long-Run Growth", Journal of Political Economy, 
Vol. 94, No. 5, October, pp. 1002-1037. 
_____________. 1987. "Growth Based on Increasing Returns Due to Specialization", 
American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings. 77, pp. 56-62. 
_____________. 1990. “Endogenous Technological Change”, Journal of Political Economy, 
Vol. 98, No. 5, S71-S102. 
Sraffa, Piero. 1960. Production of Commodities by Means of Commodities, Cambridge 
University Press. 
United Nations. Yearly. National Accounts Statistics: Main Aggregates and Detailed 
Tables, World Bank and Oxford University Press. 
World Bank. 2001. World Development Indicators 2001, World Bank and Oxford 
University Press. 
____________. 2000. Global Development Finance & World Development Indicators. 
Young, Alwyn. 1991. “Learning by Doing and the Dynamic Effects of International 
Trade”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 106, May, pp. 369-405. 
____________. 1993. “Invention and Bounded Learning by Doing”, Journal of Political 
Economy, Vo. 101, June, pp. 443-472. 
 
 
 15
DOCUMENTOS DE TRABAJO 
Appendix 1 
Unbalanced Panel Data 
Nine Countries, Thirty Observations 
Country Year G10 OL DL RGDP EDU I10 GN10 
   (%)  (%) (%) (1985 US$) (Year) (%) (%) 
Colombia 1953 0.80 50.0 37.2 1,760 2.34 21.3 3.05 
  1966 3.20 65.4 52.3 2,126 2.77 17.7 2.55 
  1970 3.39 69.0 53.9 2,387 2.71 16.6 2.35 
Mexico 1950 2.58 54.3 40.5 2,224 1.50 16.4 3.26 
  1960 3.53 68.9 51.3 2,870 2.41 18.7 3.19 
  1970 3.55 63.9 52.0 4,061 2.45 21.6 3.13 
  1975 1.15 69.5 54.2 4,755 3.31 21.4 2.62 
Turkey 1963 3.32 52.1 46.4 1,884 2.05 18.9 2.55 
  1968 3.78 56.7 51.5 2,181 1.99 22.4 2.34 
  1973 1.62 59.6 52.8 2,612 2.72 23.8 2.21 
Yugoslavia 1962 5.71 82.2 67.9 1,815 5.06 37.2 0.89 
  1966 4.97 79.5 61.9 2,324 4.83 35.4 0.96 
  1972 3.78 87.3 59.4 3,126 5.28 36.5 0.97 
Japan 1955 8.26 89.9 81.3 1,865 5.84 23.3 0.97 
  1960 9.49 94.5 82.7 2,701 6.71 29.5 1.04 
  1965 6.62 94.6a 82.4 4,125 7.07 33.5 1.27 
  1970 3.70 106.3 88.7 6,688 6.80 34.2 1.19 
South Korea 1963 7.44 89.9 60.9 1,041 3.23 22.4 2.21 
  1970 5.82 89.8 58.7 1,722 4.76 29.3 1.69 
  1973 5.22 92.8 54.6 2,133 5.77 29.6 1.58 
Taiwan 1956 4.92 76.5 42.6     852 2.51 13.6 3.06 
  1961 7.21 85.9 55.0 1,001 3.32 18.4 2.59 
  1966 7.48 92.9 55.7 1,377 3.80 24.3 2.09 
  1971 6.90 93.7 55.2 2,099 4.39 28.2 1.92 
Israel 1958 4.68 83.7 53.8 3,575 6.99 30.3 3.62 
  1965 4.73 78.6 50.5 5,280 6.76 28.9 3.03 
  1972 1.17 101.5 48.1 7,643 7.65 26.1 2.50 
Norway 1953 2.71 66.7 40.8 4,709 4.88 32.7 0.88 
  1961 3.61 77.9 47.8 5,673 5.56 33.2 0.78 
  1969 4.21 87.2 47.6 7,628 6.55 34.6 0.56 
 
Note (a): Using Kubo's estimation (1985), this figure was corrected from Kubo, de Melo, Robinson and Syrquin 
(1986). Sources. G10: Equivalent annual growth rate of real gross domestic product per capita during the 10 
following years (Summers and Heston, 1991). RGDP: Real gross domestic product per capita in 1985 constant 
prices (Summers and Heston, 1991). EDU: Educational Attainment (Barro and Lee, 1993, Data Set for a Panel 
of 138 Countries, HUMANxx: average schooling years in the total population over age 25). OL: Overall 
linkages, and DL: Domestic Linkages (Kubo, Y., J. de Melo, S. Robinson, and M. Syrquin, 1986). I10: 
Average Investment-to-GDP ratio during 10 years (calculated from Summers and Heston, 1991). GN10: 
Equivalent annual growth rate of population during 10 years (calculated from Summers and Heston, 1991). 
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Appendix 2A 
Education Regression from Panel Data 
Dependent Variable: EDU   
Method: Least Squares   
Sample: 30    
White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors & Covariance 
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
C -1.212229 0.787968 -1.538425 0.1396 
MEX -0.355881 0.315780 -1.126990 0.2731 
TUR -0.021976 0.303870 -0.072320 0.9431 
YUG 1.112144*** 0.312100 3.563419 0.0019 
JAP 1.832601*** 0.492092 3.724102 0.0013 
KOR 0.155462 0.778825 0.199611 0.8438 
TAI -0.703573* 0.383256 -1.835778 0.0813 
ISR 2.882305*** 0.360283 8.000110 0.0000 
NOR 2.075020*** 0.291506 7.118280 0.0000 
OL 0.062130*** 0.011542 5.383023 0.0000 
     
R-squared 0.948404     Mean dependent var 4.400333 
Adjusted R-squared 0.925185     S.D. dependent var 1.861372 
S.E. of regresión 0.509128     Akaike info criterion 1.748968 
Sum squared resid. 5.184232     Schwarz criterion 2.216034 
Log likelihood -16.23452     F-statistic 40.84705 
Durbin-Watson stat. 1.880405     Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000 
     
 
 
Appendix 2B 
Education Regression from Panel Data 
Dependent Variable: EDU   
Method: Least Squares   
Sample: 30    
White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors & Covariance 
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
C -5.256147 1.868856 -2.812495 0.0094 
RGDP 0.000277*** 7.15E-05 3.879813 0.0007 
GN10 0.278613 0.378143 0.736791 0.4681 
I10 0.123609** 0.045936 2.690877 0.0125 
OL 0.063592*** 0.009977 6.373753 0.0000 
     
R-squared 0.849559     Mean dependent var 4.400333 
Adjusted R-squared 0.825489     S.D. dependent var 1.861372 
S.E. of regression 0.777580     Akaike info criterion 2.485751 
Sum squared resid 15.11577     Schwarz criterion 2.719284 
Log likelihood -32.28627     F-statistic 35.29457 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.238821     Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000 
     
           Significance level: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%. 
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Appendix 3 
Cross-Country Data Base 
Fifty Two Countries 
COUNTRY G RGDP GPOP I EDU LIFE IND IO IOMAN
Algeria 0,123842284 5095,49 2,54738 15,57952 1,55 59,28 11,27436 36,12268 60,65188 
Argentina 0,403566297 10920,88 1,40455 14,65048 6,62 69,59 25,27867 41,59721 58,39808 
Austria 0,904394508 17907,14 0,35026 23,54857 8,42 72,65 29,2156 48,45707 62,95066 
Bangladesh 0,741547445 1347,85 1,98161 8,88429 1,68 48,47 9,800526 31,3015 69,11469 
Benin 0,141677916 1130,22 3,16948 8,67190 0,65 48,44 5,379944 30,58882 68,37335 
Bolivia 0,052563822 3069,9 2,04218 9,10476 4,00 52,24 14,16872 36,43516 64,71951 
Botswana 2,124176185 2768,72 2,76544 17,39524 2,29 58,09 6,118571 42,54439 72,81411 
Burkina Faso 0,292859241 751,63 0,02867 10,50333 0,78(a) 44,01 11,86 34,72 64,13 
Burundi -0,405874666 893,95 1,62694 4,62333 1,23 46,71 12,85013 30,4 60,9 
Cape Verde 1,682880276 1929,96 0,01533 15,40190 3,00(a) 61,00 4,80 33,33 58,73 
Cameroon -0,761918733 2370,16 2,66124 4,96571 1,73 49,96 10,07828 39,32529 67,81481 
Canada 0,687546113 18634,75 1,12917 23,21381 10,23 74,72 19,47591 60,29626 67,80181 
Chile 1,676242809 6675,13 1,57158 17,95762 5,96 69,30 21,51048 44,99377 63,51016 
Colombia 0,655013924 4828,63 2,02383 12,38333 3,94 65,91 23,2868 41,26383 64,25256 
Costa Rica 0,579764248 6990,17 2,422151 8,866190 4,70 72,70 18,59875 54,8545 68,3 
Cyprus 2,01127172 8422,27 1,08616 18,15381 6,53 74,60 18,22155 45,02928 67,03731 
Denmark 0,826336824 18970,29 0,20725 20,28762 9,16 74,29 19,73832 47,74991 67,52627 
Ecuador -0,242743444 5024,58 2,47682 18,95619 5,40 63,26 17,84806 45,43264 64,78324 
El Salvador 0,597711021 3985,98 1,47727 7,37952 3,30 57,10 15,01626 33,29592 60,58287 
Fiji 0,300053408 4549,24 1,36710 12,60762 6,01 68,25 11,58798 46,34994 74,70726 
Finland 0,525264173 15898,38 0,39975 26,26762 8,33 73,19 27,35022 52,63348 69,25085 
France 0,738793174 17437,78 0,47854 22,20857 6,77 74,25 25,47335 45,98747 64,43179 
Gambia -0,212459168 876,86 3,62624 10,30048 0,63 40,18 6,606752 31,21658 72,35856 
Germany 0,85928764 17613,58 0,25286 23,48286 8,41 72,63 33,63514 63,5 64,5 
Ghana 0,325422081 1141,61 2,89911 5,47238 2,35 53,21 7,7619 26,31165 53,09951 
Iceland 0,524266339 18727,74 1,05183 22,28857 7,11 76,63 18,09704 49,49224 69,10832 
Jamaica 0,624611576 3705,79 0,87435 14,11381 3,60 70,75 16,1111 55,11065 73,15779 
Japan 1,077577808 15520,33 0,42053 31,05476 8,23 76,01 28,19996 51,9 70,4 
Jordan -0,632393996 4458,36 4,27767 16,98095 2,93 64,41 11,86719 38,42105 59,34685 
South Korea 2,937687598 4496,54 1,02823 35,46429 6,81 66,84 29,59015 56,66561 76,44427 
Kuwait 0,507645743 30059,83 1,84278 14,53095 4,29 70,78 5,559896 24,86793 74,91187 
Mauritius 2,022589104 6246,1 1,01489 10,68381 4,50 65,98 19,85702 47,50226 67,83147 
Mexico 0,117632851 7271,13 1,94802 17,23476 4,01 66,76 21,93448 36,41993 58,55291 
Netherlands 0,887649421 18169,31 0,58401 21,66429 7,99 75,72 18,91155 48,61876 72,6519 
New Zealand 0,477318553 15443,76 1,02635 20,27333 11,43 73,20 21,69477 53,64555 64,5888 
Nigeria 0,199271033 1002,73 0,02917 5,79095 0,90(a) 45,86 1,86 29,82 57,70 
Norway 1,183810729 19615,39 0,48661 25,15524 8,28 75,74 17,30906 50,6796 75,2964 
Oman 0,996918125 9559,55 0,03917 10,82429 2,73(a) 59,81 0,75 26,40 59,79 
Peru -0,463870244 4986,19 2,25444 16,40857 5,44 60,38 20,351 48,03725 67,99704 
Portugal 1,334593498 9979,1 0,22980 20,62333 3,27 71,39 30,02382 52,95856 68,41947 
Rwanda -1,042588661 1247,21 1,84295 2,98714 1,13 45,77 15,80967 34,67853 64,83141 
Sierra Leona -1,644439984 1343,22 2,26049 3,28000 0,83 35,34 3,540956 28,4 74 
Spain 1,093273137 12048,61 0,40681 22,00571 5,15 75,53 25,67592 48,3 63,1 
Sri Lanka 1,653870127 1872,15 1,28592 13,54905 5,18 68,20 18,98982 31,6 43,5 
Sudan 0,194648816 1062,64 3,09608 9,93238 0,64 48,17 8,076962 33,22901 60,60697 
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COUNTRY G RGDP GPOP I EDU LIFE IND IO IOMAN
Swaziland 1,019434926 5526,65 3,07351 10,01000 3,12 51,58 21,65173 55,16831 73,09251 
Sweden 0,609630444 18192,37 0,33051 20,27143 9,47 75,86 23,02885 48,63635 66,07289 
Syrian Arab Rep. 0,021915355 1900,05 3,14735 8,32286 2,86 61,56 3,559587 38,33954 80,50306 
United Arab Emir. -0,561881143 47628,18 4,40554 20,45952 2,88 68,22 9,121071 25,70338 48,63356 
Uruguay 0,956779511 8620,82 0,66551 12,88619 5,75 70,43 24,11038 42,19928 62,56271 
Venezuela -0,240430451 8925,36 2,35919 13,70429 4,93 68,34 15,78816 42,7308 68,29229 
Zimbabwe -0,193177419 3227,86 2,68738 12,42381 2,82 54,89 24,06963 48,75522 63,67754 
Sources. G: Equivalent annual growth rate of real gross domestic product per capita over 1980-2000 (calculated 
from Heston, Summers and Aten, 2006). RGDP: 1980 real gross domestic product per capita in constant prices; 
taken from the chain GDP series RGDPCH (Heston, Summers and Aten, 2006). GPOP: Average annual growth 
rate of population during 10 years; population data are taken from the World Bank World Development Indicators 
2001. I: Average investment-to-GDP ratio during ten years; investment and GDP data are in 1996 prices (Heston, 
Summers and Aten, 2006).  EDU: Educational Attainment (Barro and Lee, 1993, Data Set for a Panel of 138 
Countries, variable HUMANxx: average schooling years in the total population over age 25); Note (a): estimated 
value. LIFE: Life expectancy at birth in 1980 (the World Bank´s Global Development Finance & World 
Development Indicators). IND: manufacturing sector GDP share in 1980, calculated from the United Nations´ 
National Accounts Statistics: Main Aggregates and Detailed Tables. IO: Aggregate input-output coefficient. 
IOMAN: Manufacturing sector input-output coefficient. The last two variables are estimated at constant prices –
whenever possible– from the United Nations´ National Accounts Statistics: Main Aggregates and Detailed 
Tables. 
 
Appendix 4 
Cross-Country Education Regression 
Dependent Variable: EDU   
Method: Least Squares   
Sample: 52    
White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors & Covariance 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
C -1.902154 1.103255 -1.724129 0.0913 
RGDP 0.000101*** 3.57E-05 2.822693 0.0070 
GPOP -0.553746*** 0.205551 -2.693962 0.0098 
I 0.081329** 0.035959 2.261753 0.0284 
IO 0.124880*** 0.029863 4.181810 0.0001 
R-squared 0.748446     Mean dependent var 4.614423 
Adjusted R-squared 0.727037     S.D. dependent var 2.836534 
S.E. of regresión 1.481972     Akaike info criterion 3.715836 
Sum squared resid 103.2233     Schwarz criterion 3.903456 
Log likelihood -91.61174     F-statistic 34.95958 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.020578     Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000 
     Significance level: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%. 
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